After dozens of internal investigations, public statements and now two high-profile inquiries the conclusion hasn’t changed much: The July 7th terror attack in London could not have been prevented. 

For years now this has been a difficult theory to accept for victims and victims’ families. 

“It’s a matter of public safety and we can’t in all conscience walk away” says Rachel North who was injured on an underground train near Kings Cross station. 

Since late 2005,  North and dozens of other victims and their families have lobbied for a full judicial inquiry because they say they believe security authorities have not owned up to their mistakes.

“That’s not to blame people that’s to say I think now in 2009 if we don’t apply the thinking that we should have learned after 7/7, we’ll have another one” says North.

But according to the authors of the latest inquiry, the uncomfortable truth not just for victims and families but for the wider public, is that there is no guarantee another attack won’t happen, no matter what is done to improve the security architecture.

It is sobering to hear the government and others stress that the threat of attack is still severe.

Still, pulling apart the anatomy of this attack and the ensuing investigation is a useful exercise for any country. One of the key mistakes was British intelligence seemingly believing ‘it can’t happen here’.

Chris Driver Williams, a military explosives expert who was called in within minutes of the attack, says he was one of the first to suggest it was inspired by Al Qaeda and says when he voiced that during an emergency cabinet meeting, the notion was literally laughed off.

“I came out with a very early assessment that it was an Al Qaeda attack and was met with actually from one very senior intelligence figure at the time who couldn’t understand how I could come up with that assessment” says Driver-Williams.

Authorities not just in Britain, but around the world, have learned from that experience and are taking home grown terror very seriously. In particular, the security structure, how intelligence is gathered and analyzed, has been changed in Britain to ensure a more comprehensive approach to potential threats.

Driver-Williams believes that’s important because far from the ‘spectacular’ attack of 9/11, we are more likely to see future attacks model 7/7 and more recently, the Mumbai attacks in late 2008.

The investigations and inquiries post 7/7, as imperfect as they may seem to victims, have been valuable in dissecting the possible foundations for a home grown terror attack. And as that threat evolves, the British experience may prove more and more relevant in other countries.